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ABSTRACT Since Dolly the Sheep was cloned in 1996, the question of whether human
reproductive cloning should be banned or pursued has been the subject of international
debate. Feelings run strong on both sides. In 2005, the United Nations adopted its Declaration
on Human Cloning to try to deal with the issue. The declaration is ambiguously worded,
prohibiting “all forms of human cloning inasmuch as they are incompatible with human
dignity and the protection of human life”. It received only ambivalent support from UN
member states. Given this unsatisfactory outcome, in 2008 UNESCO (the United Nations
Educational, Scientiﬁc and Cultural Organization) set up a Working Group to investigate the
possibility of a legally binding convention to ban human reproductive cloning. The Working
Group was made up of members of the International Bioethics Committee, established in
1993 as part of UNESCO’s Bioethics Programme. It found that the lack of clarity in inter-
national law is unhelpful for those states yet to formulate national regulations or policies on
human cloning. Despite this, member states of UNESCO resisted the idea of a convention for
several years. This changed in 2015, but there has been no practical progress on the issue.
Drawing on ofﬁcial records and ﬁrst-hand observations at bioethics meetings, this article
examines the human cloning debate at UNESCO from 2008 onwards, thus building on and
advancing current scholarship by applying recent ideas on global governance to an empirical
case. It concludes that, although human reproductive cloning is a challenging subject,
establishing a robust global governance framework in this area may be possible via an
alternative deliberative format, based on knowledge sharing and feasibility testing rather than
the interest-based bargaining that is common to intergovernmental organizations and
involving a wide range of stakeholders. This article is published as part of a collection on
global governance.
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Introduction
UNESCO (the United Nations Educational, Scientiﬁc andCultural Organization) was founded in 1945, aiming to“build peace in the minds of men” through education,
science, culture and communication (UNESCO, 2007). Its
Bioethics Programme began in 1993. The organization deems
itself uniquely placed to lead the way in setting bioethical
standards, as the only UN agency with a mandate for both the
human and social sciences (UNESCO, 2016e). To this end, it has
adopted three declarations on bioethics: the 1997 Universal
Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights
(UNESCO, 1997), the 2003 International Declaration on Human
Genetic Data (UNESCO, 2003) and the 2005 Universal Declara-
tion on Bioethics and Human Rights (UNESCO, 2005b). After
drafting three declarations in the space of a decade, UNESCO
decided to take a “normative pause” and instead focus on
fostering take-up of the existing declarations regionally and
nationally (UNESCO, 2005a). Before long, however, it started to
consider a fourth bioethics instrument, an international conven-
tion on human cloning. From 2008 to 2011 it investigated
whether an international convention to ban human reproductive
cloning is warranted. The Working Group assigned to this
question “ﬂip-ﬂopped” back and forth: in 2008 it recommended a
convention, in 2009 it decided continued international dialogue
would be sufﬁcient and in 2010 it went back to a convention. As
member states could not agree on a way forward, the issue was
dropped in 2011 without a ﬁrm decision being made on the need
or otherwise for a convention. This can be seen as a global
governance failure. In 2014, the Bioethics Programme began to
revisit the issue. This time there was greater consensus on the
need for a ban on human reproductive cloning, but no practical
progress has been made.
This article takes a traditional global governance scenario—a
debate within a UN agency about whether to draft an
international convention—and asks why the outcome was
unsatisfactory. The analysis draws on ﬁrst-hand observations of
UNESCO’s publicly held bioethics meetings in 2010 and 2011,
ofﬁcial UNESCO records of these and other meetings and
UNESCO reports on human cloning. After a brief introduction to
(a) developments in global governance and (b) the science and
ethics of human cloning, the article charts the progress and
ultimate collapse of the UNESCO cloning debate from 2008 to
2011 and developments from 2014 onwards. It concludes that,
although human reproductive cloning is a challenging subject,
establishing a global governance framework in this area may be
possible via an alternative deliberative format.
Global governance
Ruggie (2014: 5) deﬁnes governance as “systems of authoritative
norms, rules, institutions, and practices by means of which any
collectivity, from the local to the global, manages its common
affairs”. At the global level these systems, particularly within
formal intergovernmental settings such as UNESCO, are
increasingly seen to be inadequate, with scholars variously
describing them as “facing a deep crisis” (Pauwelyn et al., 2014:
737), “suboptimal” (Ruggie, 2014: 15) and suffering the
“pathologies” of gridlock, fragmentation, disconnect between
related issue areas and conﬂicts of interest (Pegram and Acuto,
2015: 586). The old, hierarchical model of multilateral governance
is considered too rigid (Pauwelyn et al., 2014: 737) and to have
“limited utility in dealing with many of today’s most signiﬁcant
global challenges” (Ruggie, 2014: 8). Traditional intergovern-
mental organizations have not adapted to the increasing
complexity of society and the ensuing need for ﬂexible regulatory
mechanisms that can keep pace with scientiﬁc development
(Pauwelyn et al., 2014: 742–743).
These problems have led to changes and innovations in both
the theory and practice of global governance (Ruggie, 2014; Weiss
and Wilkinson, 2014; Pegram and Acuto, 2015: 588). As
Pauwelyn et al. (2014: 734) note, “Formal international law is
stagnating in terms of both quantity and quality. It is increasingly
superseded by ‘informal international lawmaking’ involving new
actors, new processes, and new outputs”. They refer to this
stagnation as “treaty fatigue” (Pauwelyn et al., 2014: 739). The
international system is becoming more pluralist and less
dominated by sovereign states pursuing narrow interests. There
has been movement towards voluntary rather than binding
regulation, as well as capacity building (Pauwelyn et al., 2014:
736; Pegram and Acuto, 2015: 591). Particularly for emerging
areas, such as the internet, regulation has been informal, with no
discussion of a legally binding treaty (Pauwelyn et al., 2014: 738).
In turn, a “second generation” of global governance scholarship,
which recognizes the complexity of global governance in a
changed global context, is focusing less exclusively on inter-
governmental politics. In the introduction to their special issue of
Millennium on global governance’s “interregnum”, Pegram and
Acuto (2015: 586 and 588) predict a “more innovative global
governance research and practice-oriented agenda” and a
transition to “a potentially more pluralist (and hopefully more
democratic) intellectual and practical ecosystem, as well as to new
structures of power”. This article applies some of these new
practices and ideas to UNESCO’s human cloning debate,
answering Pegram and Acuto’s call for “more empirical research”
(Pegram and Acuto, 2015: 595).
Human cloning and its current international regulation
Although the idea of human cloning excites strong views, there is
much confusion about what it would actually entail. Cloning can
take two forms: “reproductive” cloning and “therapeutic” or
“research” cloning. These terms are not scientiﬁcally accurate, but
are commonly used nevertheless. They stem from the process of
somatic cell nuclear transfer, whereby an enucleated egg receives
a nucleus from a somatic (body) cell. In reproductive cloning, the
embryo is implanted into a female for gestation. Through this
method, Dolly the Sheep became the ﬁrst mammal to be cloned in
July 1996. In therapeutic cloning, an embryo is harvested for stem
cells rather than brought to term (Wilmut et al., 1998: 21;
Bowring, 2004: 402–403; Isasi et al., 2004: 628; United Nations
University Institute of Advanced Studies, 2007: 6). Although
therapeutic cloning is held by many to have great potential
medically, as a source of compatible tissue and organs for those
who need transplants, it generates considerable controversy. For
people who see human life as beginning at fertilization,
therapeutic cloning is also reproductive (Isasi et al., 2004: 628;
Lo et al., 2010: 17).
Since the cloning of Dolly the Sheep, ethicists, lawyers and
scientists have argued vigorously both for and against developing
this technology for use in humans. Those in favour draw on
liberal values, citing reproductive freedom, or hope that cloning
will provide a new means to tackle infertility. Those against fear
for the psychological health of the clone, who would be unable to
enjoy what they see as the inherently human quality of having a
unique identity. Clones might be expected by their “parents” to
conform to a particular life pattern, or feel shackled by knowing
about the life of the person from whom they were cloned. Those
on both sides mostly agree that, based on the poor success rate in
animal cloning and the potential health risks to mother and child,
on safety grounds it would be unethical to attempt human
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cloning currently (Kass, 1998: 694–695; Robertson, 1998: 1372,
1410–1411 and 1415–1416; Burley and Harris, 1999: 110; de
Melo-Martín, 2002: 248–250; Harris-Short, 2004: 333 and 344;
Tannert, 2006: 239; Mameli, 2007: 87; Morales, 2009: 43; Shapsay,
2012: 357; The Ethics Committee of the American Society for
Reproductive Medicine, 2012: 804–805; Wilmut, 2014: 40–41).
Many countries have banned reproductive and/or therapeutic
cloning. In most cases, their laws refer to somatic cell nuclear
transfer rather than cloning more generally and thus newer
technologies are not covered (Lo et al., 2010: 16). Several
international and regional measures also prohibit human
reproductive cloning: UNESCO’s 1997 Universal Declaration on
the Human Genome and Human Rights (UNESCO, 1997), the
World Health Organization’s resolutions of 1997 and 1998 on the
implications of cloning for human health (WHO, 1998), the
Council of Europe’s 1998 Additional Protocol to the Convention
on Human Rights and Biomedicine, on the Prohibition of Cloning
Human Beings (Council of Europe, 1998) and the European
Union’s 2000 (amended 2007) Charter of Fundamental Human
Rights (European Union, 2012). As the Council of Europe’s
protocol has been ratiﬁed by only 23 of its 47 member states, the
EU Charter is limited to the enactment of EU law and UNESCO’s
declaration is by deﬁnition non-binding, none of these represent
an absolute ban (Council of Europe, 2016; European
Commission, 2016). Hence, at the request of France and
Germany, in 2001 the UN General Assembly began to deliberate
on a binding treaty to prohibit human reproductive cloning. Four
years of dispute and discord followed. Some states were
concerned that an embargo on reproductive cloning speciﬁcally
would implicitly endorse therapeutic or research cloning, whilst
those wishing to pursue therapeutic cloning could not support a
holistic ban. With agreement on a binding convention seemingly
elusive, the General Assembly opted for a non-binding declara-
tion. The United Nations Declaration on Human Cloning was
duly adopted on 8 March 2005, but not unanimously. 84 states
voted in favour, 34 voted against and 37 abstained (Arsanjani,
2006; Isasi and Annas, 2006; Cameron and Henderson, 2007).
The declaration, rather ambiguously, calls on states to “prohibit
all forms of human cloning inasmuch as they are incompatible
with human dignity and the protection of human life” (United
Nations, 2005). It is considered too weak an instrument to either
thwart rogue research or promote legitimate scientiﬁc endeavour
(Isasi and Annas, 2006: 63; United Nations University Institute of
Advanced Studies, 2007: 19).
The UNESCO Bioethics Programme
The UNESCO Bioethics Programme began in 1993 with the
formation of the International Bioethics Committee (IBC), made
up of independent experts. An Intergovernmental Bioethics
Committee (IGBC), comprising state representatives, followed in
1999. Each committee has 36 members. The IBC meets yearly and
the IGBC biennially. Regular joint meetings of the two
committees are also held. The IBC has various functions,
including promoting bioethics education and reﬂection on ethical
issues. The IGBC’s mandate is to examine the recommendations
of the IBC and report back to the Director-General of UNESCO
(UNESCO, 1998). The IBC works on the basis of 2-year Work
Programmes (human cloning, for example, featured in the 2008–
2009 and 2010–2011 programmes), with reﬂections on particular
topics being drafted by specially appointed Working Groups,
comprising a small number of IBC members, over the 2-year
cycle. Each Group presents their work-in-progress at IBC and
IGBC meetings and takes the views expressed at these meetings
into account in their ﬁnal reports.
Scholars from both within and without the Bioethics Pro-
gramme have analysed its efﬁcacy as a forum for ethical debate and
standard-setting.1 These analyses have mostly focused on the
negotiation of the 2005 Universal Declaration on Bioethics and
Human Rights. The interest-based bargaining often seen within
intergovernmental organizations led to vague wording on beginning
and end of life issues and risk assessment, while controversial issues
such as sex selection, gene therapy and stem cell research were left
out entirely, as states could not reach a consensus on these (Schmidt,
2007; Langlois, 2013). UNESCO claims that its status as an
intergovernmental body differentiates it from ethics institutions
outside of the UN like the World Medical Association, a professional
body (ten Have, 2006: 342). However, there has been a lack of buy-in
from the global bioethics community, particularly academics, who
have questioned the expertise and representativeness of the IBC
(Cameron 2014: 237 and 240). The lack of enforcement power of the
2005 declaration, as a non-binding instrument, has also been noted.
Yet Cameron (2014: 252 and 261) argues that declarations have
advantages over conventions, because of their reliance on moral
persuasion and their inclusivity in comparison to conventions,
which are only binding on those states that accede to them.
UNESCO suffered a major setback in 2011, when the United States
withdrew funding in light of Palestine’s admittance as a member
state, a cut of 22 per cent of the operational budget (UNESCO,
2011e; UNESCO, 2013a).2 The Bioethics Programme has emerged
relatively unscathed, however, as its budget allocation has largely
been protected (UNESCO, 2013c; UNESCO, 2016a).
The human cloning debate at UNESCO 2008–2011
At the request of then Director-General of UNESCO, Koïchiro
Matsuura, in 2008 the IBC decided to investigate the possibility of
a convention on human cloning and appointed a Working Group
on Human Cloning and International Governance (UNESCO,
2009a: 1–2). This was a response to the publication of a report the
previous year by the United Nations University’s Institute of
Advanced Studies, entitled Is Human Reproductive Cloning
Inevitable: Future Options for UN Governance. The Working
Group was tasked with reviewing “whether the scientiﬁc, ethical,
social, political and legal developments on human cloning in
recent years justify a new initiative at international level”, rather
than examining the ethics and science of human cloning per se or
drafting a legal text (UNESCO, 2008a: 1). The IBC and IGBC
meetings where human cloning was discussed took place as
follows: (Table 1)
The Working Group’s ﬁrst report was an interim report,
published in September 2008. It recommended a new, binding
international convention to ban human reproductive cloning
(UNESCO, 2008b: 4). The report was discussed the following
month by the IBC and IGBC (the IBC met for 2 days by itself and
Table 1 | IBC and IGBC meetings where cloning was
discussed, 2008–2011
Date Event
28 to 31 Oct 2008 Fifteenth Session of the IBC (2 days); Joint
Session of the IBC and IGBC (2 days) (Paris)
9 to 10 Jul 2009 Sixth Session of the IGBC (Paris)
23 to 25 Nov 2009 Sixteenth Session of the IBC (Mexico City)
26 to 29 Oct 2010 Seventeenth Session of the IBC (2 days)*,;
Joint Session of the IBC and IGBC (2 days)*
(Paris)
31 May to 2 Jun 2011 Eighteenth Session of the IBC* (Baku)
5 to 6 Sep 2011 Seventh Session of the IGBC* (Paris)
*Meetings attended and observed by the author.
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then jointly with the IGBC for 2 days), where it was given an
ambivalent reception. Many participants did not believe there had
been sufﬁcient change in national positions to avoid a repetition
of the fractious debate and unsatisfactory outcome at the UN
General Assembly a few years before. On the other hand, some
delegates underlined the potential utility of a convention for those
developing countries yet to legislate on cloning (UNESCO, 2010a:
6 and 12). In response to these discussions, the Working Group
was more cautious in its ﬁnal report of June 2009. Judging that
the introduction of a new international normative instrument
would be premature, it recommended increased global dialogue
as an alternative (UNESCO, 2009a: 7). This suggestion was
commended by the IGBC at its July 2009 meeting, with several
participants noting that developing countries that do not have “a
well-developed national bioethics infrastructure” would beneﬁt
particularly from international level debate (UNESCO, 2009b: 4).
The cloning mandate continued into the next Work Programme
of 2010–2011. After discussion at its November 2009 meeting and
on the advice of the IGBC, the IBC instructed an expanded
Working Group to continue its work on cloning by examining
three issues: (a) the ethical impact of terminology (b) dissemination
activities and (c) regulation of human reproductive cloning
(including by moratorium). The Working Group duly delivered
a draft report to the IBC and joint IBC–IGBC meetings of October
2010. On options for regulation, it found that a more robust
instrument on human reproductive cloning than existed currently
was needed, such as an international convention or moratorium
(UNESCO, 2010b: 1 and 6). The reception from the IBC and IGBC
was again mixed, as reported by the UNESCO website:
IBC members were unequivocal in expressing concern that the
recent scientiﬁc developments have raised a need for a binding
international legal instrument. However, feedback by Member
States of IGBC was indicative that the political hurdles that
have prevented the realization of such instrument in the past
are still in place. [sic] (UNESCO, 2016b)
As noted in the ofﬁcial record of the IBC-only meeting,
members considered it “imperative” that binding international
law to ban human reproductive cloning be put in place
(UNESCO, 2011d: 6). By contrast, within the joint IBC–IGBC
meeting that followed, the US delegation was perplexed as to why
the possibility of a convention was “back on the table”, after it had
seemingly been rejected in the 2008–2009 Working Group’s ﬁnal
report. It advocated ongoing dialogue instead, alongside support
for states developing national regulations on cloning. Germany
and Brazil also backed the status quo, prompting one IBC
member to ask why in 2010 they believed a convention to be
premature, when in 2001, the year the idea was ﬁrst put to the
UN, they had thought one timely. Meanwhile, some developing
countries stated their desire for a convention on cloning (but not
necessarily a prohibitive one) (personal observations, Joint
Session of the IBC and IGBC, October 2010). Given the diversity
of views, it was left that the IGBC would “thoroughly examine the
issue” at its next session (to be held in September the following
year), after the IBC, via the Working Group, had ﬁnalized its
report (UNESCO, 2016b).
The IBC held its next meeting in May–June 2011, at which the
Working Group presented a draft “ﬁnal statement” rather than a
ﬁnalized version of the draft report of the previous year. This
statement repeated the recommendations of the 2010 draft report,
emphasizing that developing countries that do not have national
regulations on human reproductive cloning are in particular need
of a binding international convention or moratorium. In addition,
it suggested that “technical manipulations of human embryo,
either for research or therapeutic purposes” [sic] (that is, what is
commonly known as therapeutic or research cloning) should
carry on being regulated at domestic level, in accordance with
social, historical and religious contexts (UNESCO, 2011b: 3).
The IBC chose not to adopt the statement because of the now
“divergent positions” of its members on both the ethics and
governance of cloning (UNESCO, 2011c: 4). At the ethical level,
some members were not convinced that the potential for
detrimental genetic determinism was a strong enough argument
against reproductive cloning, whilst at the political level, some felt
the committee could make little progress while consensus among
states remained elusive (personal observations, Eighteenth
Session of the IBC, May–June 2011).
At the IGBC’s September 2011 meeting, the outgoing IBC
Chair reported on his committee’s activities. With regard to the
cloning debate, he explained that despite some members having
wanted to go to a vote on whether to adopt the Working Group’s
draft statement, he had opposed this, because the IBC had always
operated by consensus in the past. He also expressed his belief
that consensus on a ban will always be impossible to achieve,
because at its core the issue is philosophical rather than scientiﬁc,
concerning the status of the early embryo. IGBC delegations
agreed for the most part, the United States, Austria and Denmark
echoing IBC members in predicting that further efforts to reach
an agreement on regulation would prove fruitless (personal
observations, Seventh Session of the IGBC, September 2011). The
ofﬁcial conclusions of the meeting noted the topic’s ongoing
importance, but also the absence of any consensus among both
states and IBC members. Hence the IGBC merely called on
UNESCO “to continue to follow the developments in this ﬁeld in
order to anticipate emerging ethical challenges” (UNESCO,
2011a: 3). Subsequently, the 2012–2013 IBC Work Programme
consigned cloning to monitoring by a few IBC members, who
were in turn to report any signiﬁcant developments in the ﬁeld to
the committee and thereby the Director-General of UNESCO
(UNESCO, 2016f).
After 4 years of work and discussion, then, UNESCO’s inability
to come to a consensus on whether or not a convention to ban
human reproductive cloning would be desirable meant that a
decision against a convention was made by default. The Working
Group’s draft ﬁnal statement of 2011 had concluded, “The
current non-binding international regulations cannot be con-
sidered sufﬁcient in addressing the challenges posed by the
contemporary scientiﬁc developments and to safeguard the
interests of the developing countries that still lack speciﬁc
regulations in this area” (UNESCO, 2011b: 3). If this is the case,
UNESCO’s failure to meet the need identiﬁed by its Working
Group is problematic, as there is a governance gap.
2014–2015 developments
In its 2014–2015 Work Programme the IBC revisited the topic of
human cloning as part of its wider efforts to update its earlier
work on the human genome and human rights. The June 2015
draft report of the Working Group appointed to this task
reiterated the need for a ban on human reproductive cloning. It
also called for “a global forum of scientists and bioethicists, under
the auspices of the United Nations” to investigate what the
consequences of new genomic technologies might be and stated,
“The United Nations should be responsible for making funda-
mental normative decisions. The precautionary principle should
be respected, ensuring that substantial consensus of the scientiﬁc
community on the safety of new technological applications be the
premise for any further consideration” (UNESCO, 2015b: 25–27).
The IGBC, on reviewing this draft report at its July 2015
meeting (Ninth Session), found the IBC’s recommendations to be
“pertinent and timely” (UNESCO, 2015a: 2). This was in marked
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contrast to the comments by some of its members a few years
before that a ban on human reproductive cloning would be
“premature” (UNESCO, 2009a: 7). Perhaps wary of ceding
“territory”, the IGBC stressed that UNESCO was the appropriate
forum for discussion of a ban. In the ofﬁcial conclusions of the
meeting, it also invited the Secretariat of the Bioethics Programme
to “collect and compile existing legal models, case studies and best
practices” on cloning and other issues relating to the human
genome addressed in the report (UNESCO, 2015a: 2–3). The draft
was revised in light of the IGBC’s comments and then discussed
and revised again at the IBC’s 22nd Session in October 2015. The
ﬁnal version—Report of the IBC on Updating Its Reﬂection on the
Human Genome and Human Rights—states that the UN should be
responsible for fundamental normative decisions “through its
several agencies and bodies and other possible procedures of
consultation and evaluation” rather than a new global forum. It
also asserts UNESCO’s position as a key player in the bioethics
community, adding that, in terms of any revisions to existing
declarations, “First of all, this is a task to perform for UNESCO,
building on its well-established, pivotal role as a global forum for
global bioethics” (UNESCO, 2015c: 27–29).
The report addresses several issues that fall under the banner of
the human genome and human rights, not just cloning.
Nevertheless, cloning is prominent. The Executive Summary
includes an “open list” of recommended actions for states and
governments. The ﬁrst item is: “Produce an international legally
binding instrument to ban human cloning for reproductive
purposes”. There are also recommendations for scientists and
regulatory bodies, who are to “renounce the pursuit of spectacular
experiments that do not comply with the respect of fundamental
human rights” (UNESCO, 2015c: 3–4). The main text expands on
this, to state that such experiments should be discouraged (by not
being allocated public funds, for instance) and in some cases
prohibited, where there is no medical justiﬁcation and a risk to
safety. That this refers to cloning is made explicit, as follows:
“Research on the possibility of cloning human beings for
reproductive purposes remains the most illustrative example of
what should remain banned all over the world” (UNESCO, 2015c:
26). More generally, the report advocates a conservative approach
to decision- and law-making that may be particularly relevant to
human embryonic stem cell research, or “therapeutic cloning”. It
encourages the adoption of legislation at international and
national levels that is “as non-controversial as possible, especially
with regard to the issues of modifying the human genome and
producing and destroying human embryos”, to respect differing
sensitivities and cultures (UNESCO, 2015c: 3 and 6).3 With
regard to developing countries, the report acknowledges that they
may not have major access to new genomic technologies in the
near future, but recommends that LMIC (low and middle income
country) governments develop national policies on genomics
“within the context of their national economic and sociocultural
uniqueness” (UNESCO, 2015c: 29). The report also makes
recommendations for “all actors of civil society”, including the
media, educators and businesses. The former are to “avoid any
sensationalism”, whilst the latter are not to chase proﬁt by
operating in countries with weak regulations (UNESCO, 2015c:
3–4).
Analysis
Hofferberth (2015: 616) is critical of the assumption that “global
problems are tractable and solutions feasible if actors will only
come and work together to solve them”. As shown above, some
members of the IBC and IGBC believed that the reason why they
failed to reach consensus during the ﬁrst 4 years of debate on
human cloning (2008–2011) was the inherently irresolvable
nature of the problem itself. But other controversial areas, such as
business and human rights, have not proved immune to recent
efforts towards policy and norm convergence (Ruggie, 2014: 6).
Another possible explanation for the failure, then, is that the legal
and organizational structures directing the deliberation did not
lend themselves to consensual decision-making. In the early
2000s the UN General Assembly had found that the old model of
state-based treaty negotiation did not work for human cloning,
when it failed to agree on a convention and chose a non-binding
declaration instead. UNESCO’s experience was similar, although
it was not negotiations on treaty content that failed, but the
preceding stage of deciding whether or not to attempt to draft a
treaty. In raising the possibility of a convention in 2008,
UNESCO was going against the emerging trend within global
governance towards voluntary rather than binding regulation,
combined with capacity building. Germany, for example, which
was one of the states that originally espoused the idea of a human
cloning convention at the UN in 2001, now looks for other, less
rigid means by which the goals of a proposed treaty can be
reached (Pauwelyn et al., 2014: 739). Within UNESCO, as in
other intergovernmental organizations, it is states that make the
ﬁnal decisions, so even if in 2011 the IBC (made up of
independent experts) had continued to insist on the desirability
of a convention, it would only have had the power to recommend
to member states that they take the idea forward.
Pauwelyn et al. (2014: 734) advocate “thick stakeholder
consensus” over the “thin state consent” that is the hallmark of
the old hierarchical approach to governance. As a treaty could be
based on back-room deals between undemocratic states and yet
be recognized as international law, they argue that formality is no
guarantee of legitimacy, if the latter is assessed in terms of
inclusiveness and effectiveness rather than tradition. Rather, the
process by which agreement is reached is crucial, as well as the
outcome. Careful, open and expert deliberation can lead to high
quality outputs, which may or may not be legally binding
(Pauwelyn et al., 2014: 748–749). One way to achieve both
process and output would be to loosen UNESCO’s understanding
of “consensus”. By sticking to a rigid deﬁnition of consensus at its
2011 meeting, the IBC effectively gave each member a veto.
Pauwelyn et al. (2014: 754–755) contrast this type of arrangement
with the “standards world” (that is, the International Organiza-
tion for Standardization and the International Electrotechnical
Commission), which sits outside the intergovernmental system.
Here, where governance is seen to be nimbler and more ﬂexible
than in traditional governance settings, “consensus” means that
“the views of all parties concerned must be taken into any account
and an attempt must be made to reconcile conﬂicting
arguments”, so that general agreement can be reached. This level
of consensus might be a more realistic target for the IBC and
IGBC, enabling them to move forward.
One problem the Bioethics Programme has faced consistently
is lack of time for in-depth discussion. At the IBC meeting in
May–June 2011, for instance, the public session devoted to
cloning lasted little more than an hour (although the committee
later continued its discussions in a private meeting). This was not
unusual. At the IGBC’s September 2013 meeting (Eighth Session),
which reviewed 20 years of the Bioethics Programme, one
delegate stated that their government would stop funding their
attendance at such meetings unless more time were given to
dialogue and papers were sent out early enough for delegates
to consult with the relevant ministries on what position they
should take (personal observations, Eighteenth Session of the
IBC, May–June 2011 and Eighth Session of the IGBC, September
20134). The Bioethics Programme has already started to
implement such changes. More time was allocated to each
discussion topic at the IBC and joint IBC–IGBC meetings of
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September 2014 than at previous sessions, an online forum for
past and present IBC members has been established and concept
notes to invite written comments from the IGBC on the IBC’s
work ahead of meetings have been introduced (UNESCO, 2015d:
2 and 17).
If deliberations were to emulate recent innovations in other
intergovernmental fora, they might be improved further. After its
disappointing Copenhagen round in 2009, the Conference of the
Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change has moved from formal treaty negotiations that
encouraged bargaining and confrontation to workshops and
roundtables designed to foster knowledge exchange. This has
resulted in “positive competitive dynamics” among states wishing
to be leaders in the ﬁeld of climate change mitigation (Rietig,
2014: 372–374). Other stakeholders have also been given a
stronger voice; the Paris conference of 2015 made space for
NGOs, businesses and cities to share best practices. Furthermore,
the Paris Agreement of December 2015 takes a bottom-up
approach, in that it is based on Intended Nationally Determined
Contributions (pledged targets and actions) by individual states
(Busby, 2016: 3, 4 and 7). Similarly, after the UN failed to adopt
both a code of conduct and a set of norms on business and
human rights after several years of trying, it piloted a different
standard-setting method. Based on a series of site visits to ﬁrms
and communities, extensive research and testing of key proposals
through feasibility studies, pilot grievance mechanisms and
scenario-based exercises, as well as multistakeholder consulta-
tions, the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights were
endorsed by the Human Rights Council in 2011 and have since
been adopted by several other bodies, including business
associations. Ruggie (2014: 5–6 and 10), who directed the
consultation process, claims that producing the guiding principles
through this “polycentric governance” enabled them to achieve
the “thick” consensus advocated by Pauwelyn et al.
Ruggie (2014: 10) argues that conceptual arguments must be
supported by experiential ones if they are to persuade people of
the need for change. The cloning debate is necessarily conceptual,
as while questions over safety prevail there is no way to
experience cloning to see whether fears (about autonomy and
individuality, for example) are founded or unfounded. The closest
proxies are animal cloning and twin studies. Yet sharing of
national regulations and policies on cloning via workshops and
roundtables and scenario-based exercises involving potential
stakeholders would be feasible. Similar exercises (collating
examples of legal frameworks, best practices and case studies)
were suggested by the IGBC in their response to the IBC’s 2015
draft report on the human genome and human rights. Such
activities could meet developing countries’ needs for something
on which to base national cloning legislation, identiﬁed by all
three IBC Working Groups (2008–2009, 2010–2011 and 2014–
2015), by alternative means to a binding international conven-
tion, the latest recommendations of the IBC on this (and the
IGBC’s endorsement of them) notwithstanding. Continuing to
develop the Bioethics Programme’s deliberative format, away
from short, formal discussions within committees towards more
in-depth information exchange between a broader range of
stakeholders, bottom-up pledges of action and development of
best practice through feasibility studies, may not result in a
decision to begin negotiating a treaty (or even a softer
declaration), but could lead to a set of resources and commit-
ments that might prove equally effective in promoting ethical
behaviour on the part of states and other actors. An added beneﬁt
would be that this type of less legalistic, more ﬂexible deliberative
output could be more easily adapted and developed to take
account of future scientiﬁc advances (Pauwelyn et al., 2014: 742–
743). Even if UNESCO were to decide to follow the IBC’s 2015
recommendation to pursue the elaboration a further international
legal instrument on human cloning, adopting these measures
could result in a qualitatively stronger instrument than the
Universal Declaration of Bioethics and Human Rights, for
example, as there would be less interest-based bargaining and
more buy-in from stakeholders.
Conclusion
When intergovernmental organizations are unable to agree on a
form of binding international law such as a convention, they
sometimes settle for a declaration, which is less demanding of
states. This occurred at the UN in 2005, when the General
Assembly could not resolve its members’ differences on what the
content and reach of a convention on human cloning should be.
Declarations have been the preferred option for UNESCO’s
Bioethics Programme in the past, as the drafting period is usually
shorter than for a convention and the ﬁnal product is more likely
to inspire consensus, partly because it will be seen to be more
ﬂexible and less onerous than a binding piece of legislation
(Langlois, 2013: 65–66). But this was not a viable path for
UNESCO when it came to the regulation of human cloning,
because an international declaration—the United Nations
Declaration on Human Cloning of 2005—already existed. The
Bioethics Programme thus broke with previous practice and
began to investigate the possibility of a convention on cloning in
2008. There was tension between IBC and IGBC members over
whether a convention would be desirable, with the former (the
independent experts) supporting a ban on human reproductive
cloning and the latter (representing states) concerned that
negotiations would simply revisit the disagreements of the UN
General Assembly debates of a few years before. Ultimately, with
consensus within and between the two committees proving
elusive, the idea of a cloning convention dropped from their
agendas in 2012.
The idea was taken up again in 2014, as part of the IBC’s work
on the human genome. We can only speculate as to why the
IGBC of 2015 was keener on a ban on human reproductive
cloning than the IGBC of 2008–2011. The United States was no
longer a member, but Germany and Brazil still were (UNESCO,
2016c). It could be that, since the ﬁrst human therapeutic (or
research) cloning via somatic cell nuclear transfer took place in
2013 (Tachibana et al., 2013), human reproductive cloning has
moved from the realms of science ﬁction to real possibility in the
eyes of policy-makers. Or the changes to the deliberative format
at IBC and IGBC meetings introduced in 2014, such as pre-
session concept notes and longer discussions, may have
engendered greater consensus between the two committees. Yet,
despite this consensus, there has been no move on the part of
UNESCO to start to develop a treaty. In past standard-setting
endeavours, an IBC Working Group has done the initial drafting,
but the IBC Work Programme of 2016–2017 makes no mention
of human cloning (UNESCO, 2016d).
For those states that have yet to formulate national regulations
or policies on human cloning, the continued lack of clear
guidance at international level may be particularly unhelpful.
Thus better global governance in this area is needed. In its 2015
report on the human genome and human rights, the IBC fell
somewhere between old and new forms of global governance.
There was a strong call for an international binding instrument
on human reproductive cloning, to be produced by states and
governments, but there were also recommended actions and
principles for a broad range of stakeholders, including national
governments, scientists, the media, educators and corporations.
The science and politics of human cloning have moved on since
2011, when states’ positions were seemingly intractable. Were the
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Bioethics Programme to mirror successful moves in other fora,
such as the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Human
Rights Council, towards knowledge sharing, scenario-based
exercises and action pledges involving a wide range of
stakeholders, a robust global governance framework for human
cloning—whether a legally binding instrument or something
more ﬂexible—might be achievable.
Notes
1 See, for example, Macpherson CC (2007) Global bioethics: Did the universal
declaration on bioethics and human rights miss the boat? Journal of Medical Ethics; 33
(10): 588–590; Snead CO (2009) Bioethics and self-governance: The lessons of the
Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights. Journal of Medicine and
Philosophy; 34 (3): 204–222; Kirby M (2010) Health care and global justice. Singapore
Academic of Law Journal; 22 (special ed. 2): 785–800; Langlois A (2013) Negotiating
Bioethics: The Governance of UNESCO’s Bioethics Programme. Routledge: Abingdon;
Cameron NM de S (2014) Humans, rights, and twenty-ﬁrst century technologies: The
making of the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights. Journal of Legal
Medicine; 35(2): 235–272.
2 After 2 years of withholding its dues, the United States lost its General Conference
voting rights in 2013 (UNESCO, 2013b). It has not had a seat on the IGBC since 2011.
3 This cautious, conservative approach is in marked contrast to the advice John Harris,
an ethicist, gave at the celebration event to mark the twentieth anniversary of
UNESCO’s Bioethics Programme, held at UNESCO headquarters in Paris in Sep-
tember 2013. He stated, “There is the danger—and this is the note on which I wish to
end—the danger presented by the precautionary principle itself, which I also believe is
one of the biggest dangers facing society and humanity. People often believe that there
is some moral imperative to be ultra-cautious in permitting new research, particularly
in the general ﬁeld of genetics. And this caution has also been very true of UNESCO’s
approach. However, it is not unusual to ﬁnd this so-called precautionary principle
being invoked in circumstances in which it is far from clear in which direction, if any,
caution lies. We cannot know in which direction caution lies without having some
rational basis for establishing the scale of likely dangers from pursuing particular
programmes of research and innovation and comparing those with the on-going costs
of failing to pursue that research to a conclusion. … I hope UNESCO will avoid the
terrible mistake it made in Article 11 of the declaration on the human genome of
saying, without argument or evidence, without a scintilla of support, that human
cloning was contrary to human dignity and must be outlawed. We’re going to have to
rethink that. We’re going to need human cloning as one technique among many
others. … We need to rethink our prejudices. We need to be slow to outlaw tech-
nology. That doesn’t mean we shouldn’t do it, but we should also do so on the full
consideration of the evidence and the argument and never simply because it would be
cheap, easy and popular.” (Transcribed from the live webcast of the event, 5 September
2013. Available at: mms://stream.unesco.org/live/room_11_en.wmv. Last accessed 5
September 2013.)
4 The author listened to the Eighth Session of the IGBC in September 2013 via live
webcast. (mms://stream.unesco.org/live/room_11_en.wmv. Last accessed 5
September 2013.)
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